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Abstract: Sentences for employers convicted of offences under NZ health and safety law have been 
subject to constraints from two main sources (i) legislation; and (ii) guideline judgment cases.  Their 
effect is to effectively split sentencing into three distinct time periods, viz., the period following the 
introduction of the De Spa Guidelines to the implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002, the second 
following the joint implementation of the Sentencing Act and the Health and Safety in Employment 
Amendment Act to the Hanham & Philp Guideline judgment in December 2008, and the third is the post 
Hanham & Philp Guideline period.  This article builds on previous work that analyses the various factors 
relevant to HSE sentencing, concentrating on the second and third periods. Among other results, this 
work shows that for period 3, although harm continues to play an important role in explaining sentences 
of reparation, its previous role in directly explaining levels of fines is replaced by various levels of 
employer culpability. The Hanham & Philp decisions incorporated harm in determining culpability and 
District Court judges appear to follow this judgment closely in this respect. The present article illustrates 
forecasted sentences for periods 2 and 3, and, for the forecasts of period 3 penalties using second period 
weights, finds that fines would have been frequently lower, often substantially so, than those that 
occurred, consistent with the Hanham & Philp Guidelines. Reparations, however, are largely unaffected.
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1 Introduction
This paper is a companion to the authors’ results of estimating a fairly comprehensive 
model of health and safety in employment (“HSE”) sentencing in New Zealand for three periods, 
the last two of which include that following the joint implementation (in May 2003) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 and the HSE Amendment Act 2002 through to the Hanham & Philp 
guideline judgment of a Full Bench of the High Court in December 20081 (“period 2”), followed 
by a period following this judgment through to April 2012 (“period 3”).2
The Hanham & Philp Guidelines resulted from successful appeals by the (then) 
Department of Labour3 in three cases considered together, with fines substantially increased in 
all cases, in part a belated response to a five-fold increase in the maximum fines introduced in 
the HSE Amendment Act 2002. These guidelines reviewed and modified the previous De Spa 
Guidelines introduced in 19934 that were codified (with little change) by the amendment as s 
51A HSE Act 1992. One major change of the new guidelines included the establishment of three
ranges of substantial starting points, based on assessments of employer culpability, for sentences 
of fines. Another was the introduction of a suggested allowance of 10 – 15 percent for reparation 
awards when considering discounts from the starting points for fines, much lower than the 
“dollar-for-dollar” discounting widely followed in judicial decisions in the second period
examined.5
In Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013), we find that the contributions to the 
magnitude of fines made by the explanatory variables typically substantially increase during 
period 3 in comparison to period 2, while all levels of employer culpability (relative to ‘medium’ 
culpability) become statistically significant determinants of fines in period 3, confirming a strong 
influence of the Hanham & Philp Guidelines on sentencing policy. Although the ‘fatal’ harm 
variable (relative to ‘high’ harm) is a highly important determinant of fines in period 2, it is not 
significant at all in period 3, while ‘low-medium’ harm is only significant in period 3. A switch 
between an important direct role for harm in determining fines in favour of using harm as one of 
  
1 Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Limited & Ors [2008] 6 NZELR 79.
2 For our earlier results, see Menclova and Woodfield (2011, 2013) and Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013). 
3 Incorporated in the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment on 1 July, 2012.
4 Department of Labour v De Spa and Co Ltd. [1994] 1 ERNZ 339.
5 For critical discussions of this practice, see Gordon and Woodfield (2006), Clark (2008) and Mason (2008).
3a number of factors used to assess culpability as outlined in Hanham &Philp (at [54]) appears to 
have received wide support by District Court judges. 
In this paper, we analyse the ability of the most general of our empirical models (called 
the ‘full’ model, and being the most comprehensive of our specifications) to forecast fines for 
individual cases in each of the two periods examined. Only case-level results and some 
illustrations of individual cases are reported, although similar forecasting analysis is available for 
fines where a s 6 offence is the sole relevant charge, and forecasts are also available for 
reparations and for total financial liability. The article is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses 
our forecasts of fines and discusses some individual outliers and serious cases by way of 
illustrating results and their possible policy implications. Section 3 discusses the uses of our 
forecasts that might be made by the parties affected by HSE legislation, while section 4 
summarizes some issues that we believe are important for the design of future forecasting work 
in this field. A brief conclusion is contained in Section 5.
2 Forecasting Using the Full Model
In this section, we use estimates of the full model for various forecasting exercises at the 
level of individual cases.
2.1 Forecasting the Hanham & Philp Appeal Cases
First, we examine aspects of the three appeal cases addressed in Hanham & Philp.
Hanham & Philp Contractors were charged in respect of an accident where an employee fell 
from height on a building site. Cookie Time were charged in respect of an injury resulting from 
inadequately guarded machinery in the food manufacturing sector. Black Reef Mine involved a 
fatality in the mining sector. Injuries from falling and those resulting from inadequately guarded 
machinery are relatively common, while fatal injuries constitute the most serious harms.
In Hanham & Philp Contractors, the defendant pleaded guilty to a s 18(1)(a) offence 
after an employee contractor fell from a patently inadequate wooden scaffold that their foreman 
had erected on a building site, suffering injury. The defendants were ordered to pay a fine of 
$5,000 plus costs and a solicitor’s fee along with reparation of $12,000. The injuries were 
sufficiently serious to prevent the employee’s return to work other than for light duties for twelve 
months and could have even been fatal given the distance of the victim’s fall. The defendants 
had met the shortfall of the victim’s accident compensation payments for much of the time off 
work.
In Cookie Time, the defendant was fined $15,000 along with a reparation award of $5,000 
after pleading guilty to a s 6 charge. Their employee victim’s right arm became caught in an 
operating conveyor belt mechanism when cleaning a roller in the system. The machine was 
4inadequately guarded. The risk had been identified but was not acted upon until after the 
accident, and the potential existed for more serious harm than that suffered. The victim suffered 
a midshaft fracture of the radius bone and was unable to work for 3 months. The defendant made 
accident compensation top-up payments prior to her return to work. 
In Black Reef Mine, the small company pleaded guilty to a s 6 charge following a fatal 
accident to an employee miner. A s 18(1)(a) charge relating to the failure of a principal to ensure 
the safety of its independently contracted mine manager was also laid.6 The mine manager (who 
survived unhurt) and the employee victim were working underground and explosive charges set 
created a sudden inflow of water from an adjacent mine. The DC judge sentenced the defendant 
to pay the victim’s widow $30,000 reparation (of a total of $50,000) for emotional harm along 
with a share of funeral costs. The emotional harm reparation was increased to $55,000 (i.e., 
nearly doubled), while the fine of $10,000 was doubled to $20,000. The HC considered the 
accident to have been easily avoidable using the procedure of pre-drilling and considered the 
company’s financial capacity greater than that evaluated by the DC judge. The fine would 
otherwise have been $70,000 were it to have been financially capable of paying all of its 
reparations and appropriate fines.
As appellant, the main submission of the Department of Labour was that the fines 
imposed at DC level in the three cases were manifestly inadequate and failed to reflect the five-
fold increase in the maximum fine for s 50 offences enacted in the amended HSE Act.
Interestingly, in all three cases the respective DC judges had set starting points for fines although 
there was no requirement that they do so. These starting points included $23,000 in Hanham & 
Philp Contractors, the range of $20,000 - $25,000 in Cookie Time, and $30,000 in Black Reef 
Mine.
2.1.1 Period 2 Forecasts of Hanham & Philp Appeal Cases
In Hanham & Philp, the High Court made distinct, if not unrelated, decisions, first to 
raise the levels of employer culpability assessed by the DC judges in each of the cases under 
appeal, and, second, to introduce ranges of relatively high starting points for fines based solely 
on employer culpability and to reject dollar-for-dollar discounting of fines to account for 
reparations in favour of a modest allowance for this factor. As a consequence, the actual fines 
imposed by DC judges complying with the new guideline judgment would be expected to be 
substantially greater than those imposed for similar cases in period 2. A question, however, 
arises as to the level of culpability that DC judges would typically assess in each appeal case. 
One hypothesis is that their assessment would simply match that of the DC judges. Another 
hypothesis, which has some appeal if it is accepted that HC judges attempt to assess facts of a 
case in a manner similar to that of DC judges at large, is that a typical DC judge would have 
  
6 A s 19 charge relating to the failure of the mine manager to take sufficient steps to ensure his own safety and that 
of others was laid and a similar charge was laid against a consulting geologist.
5assessed culpability at levels similar to that of the HC judges. Thus, we assess period 2 forecasts 
of fines imposed in the three appeal cases using both DC and HC assessments of facts of each 
case, but do not permit the introduction of mandatory starting points for fines for this exercise.
Table 1. Actual Fines Imposed for the Hanham & Philp Cases
District Court            High Court
Hanham & Philp 5,000 50,000
Cookie Time 15,000 40,000
Black Reef Mine 10,000 20,000
Table 2. Full Model Forecasts of Fines Using Period 2 Coefficients and District Court and 
High Court Assessments of Facts of the Case
District Court Assessments High Court Assessments
 Forecast Using  DC Forecast      HC Forecast    Forecast Using   DC Forecast     HC Forecast   
 P2 Coefficients         Error                 Error          P2 Coefficients       Error                 Error
Hanham & Philp 9,379 - 4,379 40,621 19,644 - 14,644 30,356
Cookie Time 13,265 1,735 26,735 16,877 - 1,877 23,123
Black Reef Mine 7,055 2,945 12,945 46,249 - 36,249 -26,249
Fines imposed by the District Courts and the High Court in the Hanham & Philp appeal 
cases are listed in Table 1. The analysis of the forecasts of fines in period 2 in these cases using 
the period 2 coefficients estimated from the full model is contained in Table 2. To understand 
these results, consider Row 1 in Table 2. The first cell shows the ex post forecast of the fine for 
Hanham & Philp Contractors made by the full model in period 2 using the DC assessment of 
facts as $9,379. Defining forecast error as the difference between a fine and the forecasted value 
of this fine, cell 2 shows that there was a $4,379 over-prediction of the fine of $5,000 imposed 
by the District Court. The third cell shows a massive under-prediction (equal to $40,621 = 
$50,000 - $9,379) of the revised fine imposed by the HC. The fourth cell shows the forecasted 
fine when HC assessments of the facts are used. In particular, the DC judge in Hanham & Philp 
Contractors did not assess culpability directly and the level of culpability is accordingly coded 
by us as ‘unknown.’ In the HC, the judges assessed culpability as medium-high. The effect is to 
6raise the forecasted DC fine by over $10,000 (to $19,644), and the magnitude of the over-
prediction of the DC fine shown in cell 5 by a similar amount to $14,644 (= $5,000 - $19,644). 
Offsetting this is the equivalent reduction in the size of the under-prediction in the HC forecast 
error to $30,356 as shown in cell 6.
This permits the HC forecast error under DC assessments ($40,621) to be decomposed 
into two components if the HC assessment of facts is what typical DC judges would have 
adopted. The first component of $10,265 represents the amount of the fine set by the HC that is 
attributable to the DC judge in the trial case fixing a fine that is lower by this amount than his 
(hypothetical) peers who are assumed to assess culpability in a similar manner to the HC judges. 
The amount of $30,356 then represents the effect of imposing a relatively high culpability-based 
starting point for the fine along with a maximum 15 percent allowance to account for reparations. 
In Hanham & Philp Contractors, the HC set a starting point for the fine at $125,000. In 
comparison, the starting point set in the DC was a mere 18 percent of this amount. Further, 
reparation was set at $12,000 in the DC and, if dollar-for-dollar discounting had been applied, 
the fine would have been reduced by $12,000 on this account. If the maximum discount rate of 
15 percent suggested by the HC had instead been applied, the fine would have been discounted 
by a mere $1,800.
The remaining cases can be interpreted in a similar manner. In Cookie Time, using the 
DC assessment of facts, the full model generates a modest under-prediction of $1,735 for the DC 
forecast but this under-prediction increases sharply to $26,735 when the HC fine is substituted 
for the DC fine. When HC assessments of facts are used, the forecast increases by only a small 
amount, from $13,265 to $16,877, changing the modest under-prediction to a similar-sized over-
prediction of the DC fine. The forecast error of the HC fine is now smaller at $23,123 than when 
DC assessments are analysed, but the difference is not very marked. In Cookie Time, the HC 
judges did not consider the DC judge to be entirely clear in her assessment of culpability but 
thought it was at a relatively low level. Instead, they revised the assessment upwards to the “cusp 
of medium and high bands.” We coded DC culpability as low-medium and HC culpability as 
medium-high, and are somewhat surprised by the small differences when using HC assessments 
of facts rather than those of the DC.
In Black Reef Mine, using DC assessments the model under-predicts the modest DC fine 
of $10,000 by nearly 30 percent. The HC under-prediction of $12,945 is $10,000 larger than for 
the DC, reflecting the decision of the HC to double the DC fine. When HC assessments are used, 
however, the forecast fine leaps to $46,249 and there is a substantial over-prediction of both the 
DC and HC fines. The latter results arise since although the fine was doubled by the HC, it was 
doubled from a relatively low level and its percentage increase was well below either of Hanham 
& Philp Contractors or Cookie Time. Even after the fine was doubled, the fine was only 28 
percent of the amount that would have been imposed on a defendant with sufficient resources to 
pay it. Black Reef Mine differs from the other two cases in that the fine in both Courts strongly 
7reflects the limited financial capacity of the company and the primacy given to reparations which 
were substantially larger for Black Reef Mine than for the other companies. Regarding 
culpability, the HC raised its level from medium-high (as assessed by the DC) to high. The 
combination of high culpability and an accident involving a fatality when using period 2 
coefficients to make forecasts would be largely responsible for driving the forecasted fine to a 
high level.
 
2.1.2 Period 3 Forecasts of Hanham & Philp Appeal Cases
Period 3 forecasts of fines in the three Hanham & Philp cases are shown in Table 3. 
These forecasts retrospectively predict the High Court’s decisions. In Menclova and Woodfield 
(2011), our models generally retrospectively predicted the High Court’s decision in relation to 
total financial liability in the De Spa appeal case well. We considered that by and large, DC 
judges had followed the De Spa Guidelines quite closely and that our back-forecasted sentences 
would typically be likely to survive appeals.
Table 3. Full Model Forecasts of Fines Using Period 3 Coefficients and District Court and 
High Court Assessments of Facts of the Case
District Court Assessments High Court Assessments
 Forecast Using  DC Forecast  HC Forecast    Forecast Using DC Forecast HC Forecast   Error as 
 P3 Coefficients      Error           Error          P3 Coefficients       Error      Error         % HC Fine  
Hanham & 
Philp 39,821 - 34,821 10,179 43,008 - 38,008 6,992 14
Cookie Time 28,260 - 13,260 26,740 54,004 - 39,004 - 14,004 35
Black Reef 
Mine
32,066 - 22,066 - 12066 36,633 - 26,633 - 16,633 83
Using DC assessments of facts, the forecasts of fines using period 3 coefficient estimates 
in Column 1 of Table 3 are very much greater than their counterparts using period 2 estimated 
coefficients. Further, whereas Table 2 shows modest under-predictions of fines in two of the 
three cases, Column 2 of Table 3 shows that for period 3, the forecast errors are of far greater 
magnitude than are their period 2 counterparts and involve over-predictions in all cases. Column 
3 of Table 3 also shows substantial differences for period 3 errors in forecasting fines imposed in 
the HC compared to period 2. Although the HC fines in Hanham & Philp Contractors and 
Cookie Time are under-predicted by $10,179 and $11,740, respectively, using period 3 back-
forecasts, the magnitudes of these forecast errors are much smaller than their counterparts 
($40,621 and $26,735, respectively), in period 2.
8Turning to the forecasts when HC assessments of facts are used, we find that all forecasts 
are greater than when using the DC assessments, a result that was also found for period 2. For 
Hanham & Philp Contractors and Black Reef Mine, both the absolute and percentage increases 
are much smaller for period 3 than for period 2. For Cookie Time, however, the increases are 
much larger than for period 2 so that the DC forecast error for period 3 shows an over-prediction 
of $39,004 compared to $1,877 for period 2. Column 6 of Table 3, however, shows an under-
prediction of $6,992 for Hanham & Philp Contractors and an over-prediction of $14,004 for 
Cookie Time using period 3 coefficients. As percentages of HC fines, these represent 14 percent 
and 35 percent, respectively. For Black Reef Mine, both DC and HC fines are over-predicted with 
a $16,633 (83 percent) over-prediction of the HC fine. This case, however, is the only one among 
the De Spa and Hanham & Philp appeals for which the defendant was adjudged to have limited 
financial capacity, the presence of which we have coded by a binary variable. Unfortunately, 
such a procedure provides no information on the extent of the incapacity of such employers and, 
consequently, we have limited confidence in the ability of our model to accurately predict fines 
in these cases. Had Black Reef Mine been capable of paying the HC’s suggested appropriate fine 
of $70,000, however, our model would have back-forecasted a fine of $47,873, a $22,127 (31 
percent) under-prediction of the (hypothetical) actual fine, yielding a considerably improved 
forecasting result.
2.2 Forecasting Fines More Generally
Our view is that our full model offers a reasonably acceptable explanation of the 
variability in HSE fines imposed in the District Courts. If a model has reasonable explanatory 
power in a given period, it follows that its ex post forecasts for the same period should also be 
reasonably accurate, although its ex ante forecasting ability for future periods is another matter.
Nevertheless, any considerable unexplained variation in fines is a cause for some concern. Some 
of this might be removed if our database were more refined.7 Some residual variation, however, 
may be due to so-called “unwarranted” variation in sentences. Unfortunately, there is little 
agreement as to what properly constitutes unwarranted sentencing variation as a concept. Rather 
than attempt to distinguish unwarranted from warranted sentencing variation, our work focuses 
on what we are able to explain rather than what we are not. Our forecasting results, however, 
may be able to throw some light on what others may consider to be unwarranted variation.
2.2.1 Ex Post Forecasting Period 2 Fines
We begin with a discussion of ex post period 2 forecasts where the actual values of the 
explanatory variables from the full model in period 2 are combined with the estimated 
coefficients for this period to yield predictions of what the level of fines would have been if a 
  
7 See section 5 of Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013) and section 4 below for discussion of this issue.
9representative DC judge had conducted the sentencing exercise. For any charge/case, the 
difference between the actual and forecast values of a period 2 fine is simply the residual 
generated in the process of estimating the coefficients of the full model using period 2 data.
Analysis of period 2 forecasts shows that the full model under-predicts the actual fine in 
55 percent of the 318 cases involving a nonzero forecast error, the remainder being over-
predictions. While a comprehensive analysis of forecast errors is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we indicate the distribution of percentage forecast errors of fines in Figure 1 and discuss the 
characteristics of several forecasting outliers.
2.2.2 Cases Where Fines are Zero
It is likely that some fines will be zero given that some employers will be sufficiently 
impecunious that they cannot do more than meet their reparation liability and perhaps not even 
that. Unfortunately, we are generally able only to detect the presence of an employer’s limited 
financial capacity rather than the extent of such a constraint. Absent limited capacity, fines 
should generally be imposed if the court is permitted to do so.
We found that in four of the 16 zero fine cases the courts were constrained under s 8(3) 
Crown Organisations (Criminal Liability) Act 2002 from imposing a fine on the Crown entities 
involved. Two of these were District Health Boards, the third was the Public Trust Office, and 
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the fourth was the Department of Conservation. The injuries in these cases were serious, 
including a serious crushing injury, another involving multiple fractures, a fatality, and the fourth 
involving carbon monoxide poisoning of two employee victims. The mean reparation awarded in 
these cases was $18,375 and the mean fine predicted to be imposed on an otherwise liable 
convicted defendant with similar case characteristics was $13,375.
In three of the remaining zero fine cases, we found that predicted fines were at very 
modest levels. In another, the predicted fine was only slightly above $1,000 and the level of 
culpability was in the low-medium range. For the remaining cases, the mean predicted fine was 
$6,596 although four exceeded $10,000 and one was negative and above the mean in magnitude. 
An attribute common to half of these cases was the presence of low-medium culpability 
including a case where the defendant made an offer of a voluntary payment exceeding the 
reparation sought by the informant by $50,000. The judge imposed a zero fine in the 
circumstances. In one zero-fine case where culpability was assessed as low-medium, the 
forecasted fine was $6,783 but the victim died from a 5.5 metre fall and eight practicable steps 
had not been taken by the defendant company. The directors were congratulated on the 
comprehensive remedial action and acknowledgment of wrongdoing.
Another case has aspects that are interesting in the light of the preferred sentencing 
process set out in Hanham & Philp. In Millard, a manufacturer of small lightweight metal 
products was charged along with its working director in respect of injuries suffered by two 
employees resulting from lengthy exposure to vibrating machinery.8 An aggravating feature was 
that the defendants were put on notice given injury symptoms but failed to satisfactorily deal 
with the problem. Starting points were collectively set at $30,000 and reparations totalling 
$20,000 were ordered. No fines, however, were imposed, Barry J. arguing (at [21]) that 
reparation by way of amends “eclipses the interests of imposing fines” in such a case. The 
starting points, however, appear to relate to the judge’s view as to total financial liability and, 
after allowing credits for mitigation, allocated all of this liability by way of reparation. 
Culpability was not specified by the judge, and the forecasted total fines are in excess of 
$27,000.
2.2.3 Evidently Serious Outliers
Cases involving evidently serious outliers involving fines that fell short of their forecast 
values by at least 150 percent are now illustrated. First, The Prayer and Power Training Trust 
Centre was fined $2,500 on five s 6 charges when an employee engaged in demolition roofing 
work with no fall protection fell 7.2 metres through a skylight and was fatally injured.9 Four of 
  
8 Department of Labour v Millard Manufacturing (1977) Limited and Howard Mervyn Millard, CRI 2005-085-
006842-43, DC Wellington, 14 December 2005.
9 Department of Labour v The Prayer and Power Training Trust Centre, CRN 06070500157-161, DC Tauranga, 18 
July 2006.
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the charges arose when the defendant (who subcontracted labour to a contractor) exposed two 
employees on each of two days to this falling hazard. No reparation award was made. Culpability 
was assessed as high. The sentencing judge acknowledged the unique position of the Trust and 
its commendable work assisting former prison inmates and reasoned that such work might be 
compromised if the usual approach to sentencing was taken.  The employer had limited resources 
to meet penalties, and attended a restorative justice conference to which weight was given in 
sentencing. The trivial nature of the level of the fine is emphasized by a comparison with the 
forecast of $30,871. It is not clear to us that ‘commendable work’ would be treated with such 
similar sympathy by other DC judges, and it is clear that ‘commendable work’ does not extend 
sufficiently far in the safety domain and does not extend at all to compensating the victim’s 
dependants. This decision raises the serious issues of the dilution of incentives to take adequate 
safety precautions and the potential for highly divergent fines and reparation awards.
Second, in Big Tuff Pallets Ltd, the fine of $1,500 for a s 17 offence compares 
unfavourably with a forecast value of $21,811.10 The injured employee had a finger tip 
amputated by a docking saw, the accident was not notified, and the defendant interfered with the 
accident scene. However, no charges were brought in respect of pre-accident breaches of duty 
and the remaining issues had resulted on account of the inadvertence of the defendant. It is much 
less surprising that in this case the fine was set at a very modest level.
Gary David Haddow was the mine manager referred above in Black Reef Mine, which 
involved a fatality. Mr Haddow, who was an independent contractor for a very small firm, was 
fined $2,000 along with reparation of $11,000 (his share along with two related defendants) on a 
s 18 charge.11 The forecasted fine was $22,541 and although the sentencing judge considered 
culpability to be lower than that of the mining company and that there had also been a 
contributory factor of a consulting geologist, the forecast error appears to us to be relatively 
large.
In Stockade Pastoral Farms Ltd, the defendant was fined $1,000 (reparation was zero) 
when the victim suffered a fractured rib when kicked by a cow during milking.12  The accident, 
however, was similar to Big Tuff Pallets discussed above and the sole s 25(3)(a) charge was for 
accident notification failure, a relatively minor offence. Although the forecasted fine was 
$20,134, this is another example for which the heterogeneity of seriousness of charges is not well 
accounted.
2.2.4 A Sample of Cases Involving Potentially High Fines
  
10 Department of Labour v Big Tuff Pallets Limited, CRN 06092501036, DC Manukau, 2 June 2006.
11 Department of Labour v Black Reef Mine; Gary David Haddow; “C” (Name Suppressed), DC Greymouth, 29 
January 2008.
12 Department of Labour v Stockade Pastoral Farms Limited. CRI-2004-081-000115, DC Waipukurau, 30 
November 2005.
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Here, we consider three serious cases involving potentially high levels of fines. The first, 
V Boothby Contractors Ltd, involved a fatal accident to an employee of another organisation 
(The Prayer and Power Training Trust Centre, fn. 9 supra) who fell from a roof during 
demolition work some 7.2 metres through a skylight to the ground.13 The risk of falling occurred 
on two days and the accident occurred on the second day. Boothby had hired three 
subcontractors to provide labour. Harding J. convicted the defendant on six s 18(1)(a) charges 
(including 5 incidents in addition to the accident) and seven further charges were withdrawn 
following a plea bargain. Culpability was assessed as high, and a fine of $16,000 was imposed 
along with reparation of $15,000. Many mitigating factors were found, although general 
deterrence was included as a sentencing factor of some importance by the judge. The small 
company attended a restorative justice conference to which specific weight was accorded in 
sentencing. The company’s limited financial capacity was also recognized. The forecasted fine of 
$30,668 was 92 percent greater than the actual fine in spite of our accounting for limited 
financial capacity by way of a dummy variable, but it is difficult to assess whether the fine could 
be viewed as being “manifestly inadequate” without more precise information on defendant’s 
financial limitations.
The second case, Sealord Group Ltd, involved a fatal accident at sea when an untrained 
employee became entrapped in the auger of a fishmeal cooking machine.14 Zohrab J. considered 
the entrapment risk a clearly identifiable hazard that should have been eliminated or minimized. 
No proper training for employees was available and an accident appeared highly likely to occur
at some stage. Culpability was rated as medium-high. Our forecast of the fine is a very modest 
$14,226. Sealord Group were fined a similarly $10,000 in total on s 13 and s 6 charges (for
which the starting points for fines were, respectively, $100,000 and $150,000) and a reparation 
order of $195,000 was entered. The company had ample financial capacity and the very modest 
fine imposed is most likely the very heavy discounting of the fine for the large reparation award, 
although there were a number of mitigating circumstances and credit was given for the strong 
turnout of company personnel in court. The only slightly higher forecasted fine suggests that 
there was little idiosyncratic about the judge’s sentence.
In Owens Cargo Ltd, a rope used to adjust the height of a work platform broke and the 
victim fell into the path of a moving logging truck.15 His legs were crushed and he suffered 
compound fractures along with a crushed right hand, fractured ribs and extensive bruising. 
Amputation was considered during his period in hospital.  Owens Cargo initially defended a 
(rare) s 49 charge but changed their plea after evidence was presented. A starting point of 
$300,000 was chosen, reflecting in part the doubled maximum fine relative to a s 50 sentencing 
  
13 Department of Labour v V Boothby Contractors Limited, CRN 06070500162-174, DC Tauranga, 18 July 2006.
14 Maritime Safety Authority v Sealord Group Limited, [2007] DCR 90, CRI 2005-042-732, DC Nelson, 24 June 
2005.
15 Department of Labour v The Owens Cargo Company Limited, CRN 07016500579, DC Gisborne, 9 May 2008.
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offence. The company, a large firm with a poor safety record, had made a voluntary payment of 
$30,000 and had topped up the employee’s accident compensation payments. Culpability was 
assessed as high since the site manager had known of deficiencies and ignored them. Senior 
management were less than well-informed but were still liable under s 49 which contains a 
constructive knowledge test. The company was fined $150,000 with reparations $22,000. The
forecasted fine was only $103,651 although this is likely to mainly reflect the predominance of s 
50 offences in our database. We assigned the level of harm as high, but would have made it at 
the higher end of this level if a finer gradation had been available. Although the forecasted fine is 
31 percent below the fine imposed, the idiosyncratic fact of it being a s 49 case seemed unlikely 
to attract an appeal.16
2.2.5 Ex Ante Prediction of Period 3 Fines Using Period 2 Estimated Coefficients
In this section, we analyse the ability of our model estimated for period 2 to predict the 
fines imposed by DC judges in period 3. Clearly, if DC judges generally complied with the 
Hanham & Philp Guidelines, we would expect to find that the model systematically under-
predicts the period 3 fines in the majority of cases.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentage 
forecast errors for cases where fines are nonzero, and is concentrated in a region of positive 
values. The mean fine imposed during period 3 is $33,476 while the mean forecast error (actual 
fine – forecasted fine) is $21,088.
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Figure 2. Histogram of Fine Forecast Errors (Percent)
Period 3 Using Period 2 Coefficients
  
16 Only 12 cases (and 16 of the 2438 charges) in our master database involve sentencing under s 49.
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Some 77 percent of the 184 observations have positive forecast errors and of the 42 cases 
involving over-prediction of fines, eight have zero fines and nine over-predict fines by more than 
150 percent. On average, however, there appears to be considerable under-prediction of fines. 
The mean forecast error as a percentage of the corresponding fine if only nonzero fines are 
included is only 7 percent, but if percentage forecast errors exceeding 150 percent in magnitude 
are excluded as outliers, this figure increases to 41 percent. Thus, we do not consider that our 
model estimated for period 2 is very suitable for forecasting post Hanham & Philp fines imposed 
by DC judges subject to the Hanham & Philp Guidelines.
Of the eight zero fine cases in period 3, the situation is fairly similar to that of period 2. 
Three cases involved Crown entities which cannot be fined. Of the remainder, three defendant 
companies were in liquidation and making reparation payments awarded would have exhausted 
their resources. In another case, however, the degree of negligence of the victim was seen as 
sufficiently high as to remove any penalty for the defendant whose culpability was seen as 
minimal, an aspect described by the sentencing judge as unique.
In apparent outlier cases where negative forecast errors exceed 150 percent of the fine 
imposed, serious financial limitations are generally present. For example, in Isaac Nasawaqa 
Smith, zero reparation was awarded against a self-employed roofing contractor whose employee 
was severely injured following a fall through an unguarded skylight and who had not been 
supplied with fall arrest equipment.17 The contractor was fined $1,000. In Murray Donald 
Clinton, the director of a cleaning company was also fined $1,000 and no reparation order was 
made.18 The company had ceased trading and the defendant, dependant on a sickness benefit, 
was no longer working. Cemac Construction Ltd. and Timoko Roofing Ltd. were similar, both 
involving serious fall injuries.19 Cemac had little, if any ability to make significant reparation or 
fine payments while the reparations in Timoko were maintained at $20,000 rather than being 
raised and an admittedly notional fine of $5,000 was imposed, the same amounts as in Cemac. In 
Hugh Michael Wilson, the defendant was an agent of a company dealing in aerials and was fined 
$5,000 with reparations of $10,000 when an employee fell and suffered serious injuries while 
installing a SKY dish.20 A claim of financial limitations was accepted by the Court. In Trevor 
Neil Dreaver, the sole director of a company that was also charged was fined a notional $1,500 
which was deducted from the company’s endpoint fine.21 As a great friend of the fatally injured 
victim, the director found continuing in business untenable and an offer of $35,000 had been 
made to the victim’s dependants (whom the director had supported). In Woolley Roofing Ltd., an 
endpoint fine of $57,000 was reduced to a “token” fine of $8,000 for a company described as 
  
17 Department of Labour v Isaac Nasawaqa Smith, DC Auckland, 7 May 2009.
18 Department of Labour v Murray Donald Clinton, CRN 09092503894, DC Manukau, 13 May 2010.
19 Department of Labour v Cemac Construction Limited, CRI 2009-019-004628, DC Hamilton, 19 February 2010, 
and Department of Labour v Timoko Roofing Limited, CRN 08092504630, DC Manukau, 5 March 2009.
20 Department of Labour v Hugh Michael Wilson T/A Marmic Installations, CRI-2011-085-002281, DC Wellington, 
20 June 2011.
21 Department of Labour v Trevor Neil Dreaver, CRI-2010-042-1094, DC Nelson, 24 September 2009.
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having a very poor financial position.22 The company’s director was related to the victim and an 
offer of $40,000 as a loan had been made, which was accepted by the court as the amount of 
reparation awarded.
The remaining outlier involving substantial over-prediction of fines is the highly-
publicised 2008 case Department of Labour v The Sir Edmund Hillary Outdoor Pursuits Centre 
of New Zealand, [2010] DCR 26. Hillary involved the defendant (a charitable trust) permitting a 
school party to enter the Maungatepopo Gorge for a canyoning expedition. The defendant's 
young and inexperienced instructor led a group of high school students and a teacher in an 
upstream gorge walk. They became trapped by rising water during their return, and took refuge 
on a small ledge for an hour to wait for water to subside. It became no longer safe to remain 
there, and they attempted to float down the gorge aiming to be rescued by the instructor. Seven 
group members drowned during this process, while the instructor and four students survived. In 
assessing culpability as high, Kiernan J. argued that a high degree of workplace risk entailed a 
high degree of responsibility to ensure the safety and supervision of employees and those they 
were supervising, especially groups of children. The tragedy was argued to be avoidable. The 
Trust, a highly experienced organisation with acknowledged expertise in the field had neither 
registered with the New Zealand Met Service to receive severe weather warnings (they would 
have received three such warnings) nor consulted its website to determine weather conditions at 
the time. Neither had they set off to provide assistance to the party when conditions rapidly 
deteriorated. The Trust acknowledged their deficiencies, aggravating features of which included 
a breach of trust, the particular vulnerability of young persons, and the extent of the harm 
suffered.
The Trust pleaded guilty to s 6 and s 15 charges, and, following the setting of starting 
points at $150,000 for each charge, (reduced to $80,000 for each charge for mitigating 
circumstances), was fined $20,000 on each charge while a reparation order of $440,000 was 
applied to the s 6 charge. The defendant carried reparation insurance which covered 
approximately three-quarters of the reparations awarded. Our forecast of the fine using period 2 
coefficients is $101,814, yielding a substantial over-prediction (of $60,814) amounting to a 155 
percent forecast error of the fine during a period where over three-quarters of predicted forecast 
errors involve under-predictions. The judge addressed the issue of limited financial capacity 
reported by the chief executive officer of the Trust, but no specific conclusions on this issue are 
provided in the judgment. The judge’s endpoint fine of $80,000 on each charge was reduced by 
75 percent (at [99]) “principally because of the defendant’s status as a charitable trust,” noting 
that the schoolchildren of New Zealand were beneficiaries of the Trust. We are unable to 
determine from this decision what was the financial capacity of the Trust to pay a fine of any 
given amount, not a particularly satisfactory state of affairs.
  
22 Department of Labour v Woolley Roofing Limited, CRN 10044502099, DC North Shore, 6 October 2011.
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Some concern would arise if a charitable trust is treated with particular leniency because 
it is a non-profit organisation per se. In Hillary (at [53]), Kiernan J. noted that counsel for the 
defendant argued in favour of a zero fine since the purpose a fine had already been served by the 
defendant’s having “already amply been held accountable, has been deterred, and has already 
incurred considerable expense in the aftermath,” the consequence being that no fine was needed 
to “bite.” This rather misses the point. A major need for a substantial fine as a deterrent is to 
deter the emergence of easily avoidable serious harms prior to their occurrence, and we would 
support the removal of prompt remedial action as a mitigating factor meriting a discounted fine 
from the HSE Act and its replacement with an increase in the fine which becomes greater, the 
longer is the absence of remediation. The incentive should be for all employers to meet the Act’s 
provisions fully or face the consequences. If organisations face inadequate fines, their incentives 
to take adequate precautions are diluted and this holds whether they are non-profit organisations 
or not, and if not, if they can correctly anticipate that they will receive heavy discounts for 
financial limitations. By not meeting their legal obligations, such employers gain a competitive 
cost advantage over those who do and have a further incentive to conceal their true financial 
capacity.
Further, it appears that most small employers who claim financial limitations when 
charged with HSE offences do not carry reparation insurance. Given the decision in Street Smart, 
however, the very employers who would be most likely to carry such insurance on the grounds 
of their degree of risk aversion have a reduced incentive to do so since the reparation payments 
they would otherwise pay absent insurance are effectively transferred in whole or part to the 
payment of fines. The attitude of many commentators is hostile to the ability to insure against 
reparations given that safety incentives will be compromised as a result. Given the primacy of 
reparation over fines in the Sentencing Act, however, others recognise that insurance offers 
(mainly emotional harm) compensation for accident victims and their dependants that might be 
unavailable to employees of financially struggling firms. Judges holding this view are inclined to 
discount fines on this basis when reparation insurance is held. If the protection of seriously 
harmed employees of small, impecunious employers is to be achieved it may be superior to share 
compensation between the employer and insurance, the latter made compulsory if necessary. The 
dilution of incentives for safety precautions arising from reparation insurance will be offset by 
the additional incentives arising when employers are exposed to higher fines when they can pay 
more than their share of reparations. Further, ‘small’ employers might be required to post a 
substantial bond (perhaps based on industry-wide accidents rates and mean fines imposed) prior 
to being permitted to operate. While many employers may not start up operations in these 
circumstances, it raises the important question of whether New Zealand’s massive dominance of 
small employers is necessarily desirable.  
The judiciary also occasionally gives generous treatment to small, relatively 
impoverished employers on the grounds that their importance in small communities is such that 
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their failure would cause excess social hardship. These decisions, however, seem at odds with 
the dynamics of business life more generally. Many small enterprises fail because demand falls, 
costs increase, or expectations of their success are over-optimistic. Others move location, 
including offshore. But more importantly, the failure of a business for any reason does not 
destroy the physical resources invested, which can generally be purchased by others. Trading and 
employment may cease, but only temporarily.
 
A second complex case involving multiple victims is Department of Labour v Icepack 
Coolstores Limited Anors, CRI 2009-019-011343, Hamilton DC, 15 December 2009. Firemen 
attending a callout entered a coolstore with the permission of the defendant's site manager who 
failed to warn that a potentially hazardous hydrocarbon refrigerant had been installed. Leaking 
gas at the site ignited for some reason, causing an explosion that effectively demolished almost 
the entire plant, with minor damage to adjacent neighbourhood properties. The site manager 
(also a director) authorised the security guard who called the fire service to permit the entry of 
the firemen. The s 6 charge brought against Icepack, however, related to the failure to provide a 
safe working environment for Icepack's employees, none of whom were harmed in this accident. 
Icepack pleaded guilty to this charge, and was fined $30,000. Although culpability was assessed 
at low-medium for all charges faced by Icepack, it was recognised that the potential for fatal or 
severe harm to employees was great, as is witnessed by the harm that befell other parties to this 
accident. A starting point of $50,000 was adopted for the s 6 charge. Icepack also pleaded guilty 
to two s 16 charges, and was fined $3,600 on each of these charges. A starting point of $10,000 
was adopted for each of these charges, which is the maximum permissible fine for an offence 
involving a breach of duty by a person who controls a workplace.
 
As in Hillary, the sentencing procedures outlined in Hanham & Philp were expressly 
applied. Discounts of 30 percent for a relatively early guilty plea, 10 percent for co-operation, 
and 15 percent for reparations to be paid through the directors were allowed. The directors 
offered an amount of $95,000 from their personal resources as reparations (amends), all of which 
was applied to the first s 16 charge. There may even have been a shortfall just for this charge 
since total reparations (to be shared with the second defendant at rates subject to the discretion of 
the Court) were assessed at $270,000. The company did not hold reparation insurance, and had 
financial limitations. The fine predicted by our model using period 2 coefficients is $15,293, an 
under-prediction of the actual total fine of $37,200 by 59 percent.
Icepack had 2 co-defendants. The first was Mobile Refrigeration Specialists Ltd. which 
had installed the refrigeration equipment. The outcome of the fire at the Icepack coolstore was 
extremely serious for the firemen involved, as is evident from the following list of injuries.
Victims - 1: Fatal blast injuries.  2: Extensive burns to 71% of body. Six months hospitalization. 
Induced coma 10 weeks. Some permanent sight loss. Needed to wear pressure garments for 2 
18
years. Highly unlikely to return to work.  3: Severe injuries to face - 600 internal stitches.  Some 
permanent damage. Severe concussion - loss of memory 6-8 weeeks. Unknown if he can return 
to work. 4: Severe burns to head, face and hands. Six weeks in hospital. Amputation of one little 
finger. 5: Broken ribs, blast lung, severe scalp and facial laceration requiring 23 stitches to face, 
off work for more than 9 months. 6: Burns to 15% of body and partial thickness burns to face, 
scalp, and neck. Concussion and hearing loss. Undergoing therapy and outpatient plastic surgery. 
7: Long-term hearing loss and burns to face and hands. Stitches under chin. Must wear gloves to 
protect hands. Lost sensation to fingertips.  8: Burns to left side of face, forehead, hands, and 
ears. Some hearing loss to left ear. Unable to work for 4 weeks.
Mobile Refrigeration was fined $56,200 on s 15 and r 18 charges (although the fine for 
breach of the regulation was notional), and faced a reparation order of $175,000. Culpability was 
assessed as high, the judge considering the defendant out of his depth in respect of technology 
new to applications in New Zealand. The defendant had failed to meet industry standards and 
operated an inadequate gas detection system. Icepack had relied on the defendant’s expertise, 
and was a major customer of the defendant.
Icepack’s second co-defendant was Wayne Grattan, described as effectively the 
managing director of Icepack and who faced a s 6 charge for acquiescing in the s 6 charge faced 
by the company. He faced a similar assessment of culpability and starting point as Icepack and 
was fined $30,000 (having made a personal contribution to the reparation awarded against 
Icepack).
Our model predicted the fines in Mobile Refrigeration and Grattan as $59,982 and 
$26,046 respectively, representing a 7 percent over-prediction of the fine in Mobile Refrigeration
and a 13 percent under-prediction in Grattan. We were quite surprised by the accuracy of these 
ex ante predictions using period 2 coefficients. The prediction for the fine faced by Icepack for 
the three charges for which they were convicted was 59 percent smaller than the actual fines, but 
included were two s 16 charges with a modest cap of $10,000 for each, an idiosyncratic 
sentencing factor not accounted for in our model.
2.2.6 Ex Post Prediction of Period 3 Fines Using Period 3 Estimated Coefficients
The distribution of percentage forecast errors resulting from the ex post predictions of period 3 
fines using period 3 estimated coefficients to construct the forecasts is shown in Figure 3. This 
figure also shows the distribution of percentage forecast errors resulting from the ex ante
predictions of period 3 fines using period 2 estimated coefficients to construct the forecasts.
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A comparison of the two distributions is instructive. For the results using period 2 
coefficients the distribution is heavily skewed to the right of zero. In comparison, the forecasts 
using period 3 coefficients show the mass of forecast errors reasonably close to zero and with 
only a small indication of rightward skewness.
When period 2 coefficients are used to forecast period 3 fines, a significant majority (77 
percent) of the resulting forecast errors are positive, indicating under-prediction of the actual 
fines imposed, while the mean forecasted fine is $20,875. The 77 percent under-prediction rate 
and mean forecasted fine of $20,875 using period 2 coefficients contrasts strongly with an under-
prediction rate of 47 percent and a mean forecasted fine of $32,679 when period 3 coefficients 
are used for forecasting. As previously noted, the mean fine imposed during period 3 is $33,476, 
well above the forecasted value using period 2 coefficients but only slightly above the mean 
forecasted fine using period 3 coefficients.23 These results are expected if DC judges generally 
comply with the Hanham & Philp Guidelines.
Both of the above distributions contain a number of outliers involving substantial over-
predictions of actual fines in period 3 and, not unexpectedly, involve the same cases for period 2 
and period 3 coefficient-based forecasts. In general, the percentage over-predictions of period 3 
  
23 We acknowledge that ex ante forecasting is likely to produce higher forecast errors than ex post forecasting.
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fines when period 3 coefficient estimates are used are substantially greater. For cases described 
as outliers involving positive actual fines and percentage over-prediction rates in excess of 150 
percent, all but two cases (Wilson and Hillary) show a substantial increase in over-prediction 
rates when using period 3 coefficients. In comparison, the forecasts generated using period 3 
coefficients produces a mean percentage over-prediction rate for negative forecast error outliers 
of 1,345 percent compared to a rate of 886 percent using period 2 coefficients. On average, 
therefore, the combination of relatively high starting points for fines together with removing full 
discounting of fines when accounting for reparations leads to increases in the predicted fines for 
most outlier cases. All of these exhibit very low fines, less than $10,000. In Hillary, however, the 
situation is rather different. There, the fine imposed was five times the largest imposed in any 
other outlier case. The resulting percentage over-prediction error falls from 155 percent to 46 
percent when period 3 coefficients are used. The decision to use culpability levels partly 
influenced by harm levels  rather than separate culpability and harm levels in determining 
starting points for fines may have the effect of making the collective imposed fines for the two 
charges in Hillary appear much more appropriate than in the pre Hanham & Philp period.
Further, it is not evident that the issue of financial capacity was fully addressed in Hillary, and 
given that the sentencing date post-dated the HC decision in Street Smart, there should be no 
reason arising from period 2 dollar-for-dollar discounting practices to explain why the fines set 
for each charge, viz., $20,000, should lie so far below their respective starting points, viz., 
$150,000. Hillary is a case where the most dramatic feature is the demise of seven young 
persons. The defendant carried reparation insurance which, in the event, covered some three 
quarters of the total amount awarded.  While inadequate to fully cover reparation obligations, 
Hillary would hardly be the circumstances to try and endorse the social desirability of contracts 
with terms that place relatively small weight on moral hazard.
In respect to Icepack, the percentage forecast errors for each of the three defendants are 
not too different when using the period 3 coefficients. For both Icepack and Grattan, the 
forecasted fines continue to lie below their actual values, the percentage under-prediction falling 
from 59 percent to 34 percent for Icepack and rising from 13 percent to 32 percent for Grattan. 
The forecast error for Mobile Refrigeration again lies close to zero but its sign switches from a 7 
percent over-prediction to a 12 percent under-prediction. On the face of it, the fine of $56,200 for 
Mobile Refrigeration seems to be a somewhat small proportion of the starting point of $140,000. 
For the substantive charge, viz., s 15, discounts of 30 percent for an early (in the circumstances, 
if not immediate) guilty plea, 10 percent for cooperation, and 20 percent for the "substantial" 
reparation sum of $175,000 were allowed. Although Mobile Refrigeration post-dated the HC 
decision in Street Smart, the sentencing judge had no need to adjust the fine on the basis of this 
decision since Mobile Refrigeration were financially capable of meeting a fine. Instead, 
however, the judge gave some credit on the basis that Mobile Refrigeration carried reparations 
insurance "for some years." The degree of cover offered by this policy is unknown to us and the
company was also described by the judge as a "small company, with one person working in it."
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In the event, our model using period 3 coefficients made a small under-estimate of the fine 
imposed and could hardly be used as a basis for a defendant’s appeal against the quantum of 
fine.24
2.2.7 The Impact of Hanham & Philp on Sentencing at an Aggregated Level
Some general forecasting impacts of the Hanham & Philp Guidelines at the aggregated 
level rather than individual level are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. The Impact of Hanham & Philp on Sentences
S 6 Charges Period 3
Actual Mean
Period 3
Forecast Mean
Difference Period 2
Actual Mean
Fines $33,907 $23,776 $10,142 $13,312
Reparations $23,168 $21,405 $1,763 $13,283
Total Liability $56,997 $45,171 $11,826 $26,595
Case Level Period 3
Actual Mean
Period 3
Forecast Mean
Difference Period 2
Actual Mean
Fines $33,476 $21,088 $12,389 $12,756
Reparations $22,571 $21,211 $1,359 $14,786
Total Liability $55,991 $42,299 $13,262 $28,742
Column 3 of Table 4 lists the period 3 forecast means for the various components of sentences, 
the forecasts applying period 2 estimated coefficients from the full model to generate period 3 
forecasts. The forecast errors in column 4 are uniformly positive, so that forecasted mean fines, 
mean reparations, and mean total liability all under-predict their realised values for both s 6 
charges and at the case level. While the model predicts substantial increases in both fines and 
  
24 As it transpired, in Mobile Refrigeration Specialists Limited v Department of Labour CRI 2009-419-94, HC 
Hamilton, 29 March 2010, Mobile Refrigeration (together with Waikato Coldstorage Ltd., formerly known as 
Icepack Coolstores Ltd.) appealed against the quantum of fines. The issue turned on the matter of whether the DC 
judge had properly taken the financial circumstances of the two companies into account when setting the fines for 
Mobile Refrigeration and Icepack, and that the companies should have been treated as stand-alone entities when 
setting the fines. In the HC, the DC starting points were accepted, but the DC judge had not explicitly stated why he 
had made no reductions in the fines although he seemed well aware of the financial limitations of the companies. 
But there was limited evidence of financial incapacity brought by the companies in the lower court and the fines 
were not manifestly excessive. Heath J. found no error of law and dismissed the appeals. We coded Icepack as 
having limited capacity in part because a major contribution to reparations had been made by the directors from their 
personal resources and that Icepack was insolvent. This did not appear to be the case for Mobile Refrigeration which 
was coded as having the capacity to meet the fine imposed.
22
reparations in period 3, the forecast errors for fines are much greater than for reparations even 
though the magnitudes of mean period 2 fines and reparations are very similar in magnitude for s 
6 charges and are reasonably similar at the case level as well. The under-predictions of total 
liability are largely due to the under-predictions of fines.
3 Uses for Forecasts of Fines
A major motivation of our work examining HSE sentencing concerns the issue of 
sentencing consistency. Given the absence of agreement as to what constitutes unwarranted 
sentencing consistency and the broad categories of circumstances that are covered by many HSE 
offences (including the most common s 6 offence), we agree with the need to examine the full 
circumstances of individual cases to detect reasons for apparent inconsistencies. The forecasts of 
fines generated by our statistical model of sentencing could help guide potential appellants on 
whether or not to proceed. In explaining differences between actual fines and forecast fines, the 
forecasts could be of major assistance in providing a benchmark for assessing the worth of 
idiosyncratic case-specific factors not fully captured by our model. Once we have access to a 
judicial decision or sentencing note in a case, or even a Return on Prosecution, we are able to  
quickly provide our benchmark of the fine that would be imposed by the representative DC judge 
given the relevant information provided.   
There is also potential for use of our forecasts by the courts. For example, High Court 
judges could use our DC forecasted fines to assist in guiding appeal baseline fine settings with 
further consideration of idiosyncratic facts of the case if the HC tries to mimic representative DC 
judgments. While this may be relevant for many appeal cases it is clearly not so for guideline 
appeal cases such as those examined in Hanham & Philp. Here, the HC judges could have 
simply adjusted fines in the three cases (and reparations in the case of Black Reef Mine) in 
response to a reassessment of culpability levels (and the degree of financial incapacity in Black 
Reef Mine). But they went much further than this by introducing a new formal range of starting 
points at relatively high levels and by removing the general ability to fully discount fines by the 
amounts of reparations awarded. These further changes were clearly designed to impose more 
severe sentencing constraints on future sentencing behaviour and, as such, constitute a guideline 
judgment.
Our forecasts could also be useful for the parties in District Court proceedings. Given the 
adversarial nature of such proceedings, DC judges typically face very different recommendations 
regarding starting points for fines from counsel representing the informant and the defendant/s 
respectively. This largely arises because of differing suggested assessments of culpability levels, 
but judges can generally make up their own minds on this matter by examining the facts of the 
case. In many cases, a middle ground is accepted. Having decided on culpability and a starting 
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point, however, DC judges might find it useful to consider the forecasts generated by our model 
that represent sentences that representative DC judges would impose given our ability to capture 
the values of sentencing factors that are required by legislation to be taken into account. Using 
our forecasts as benchmarks (to be justifiably adjusted by the consideration of case-specific 
idiosyncratic items not well captured by our model) is likely to help provide sentencing decisions 
that are in line with general practice and, consequently, be appeal-proof. One does not imagine 
that judges enjoy losing appeals against their decisions.
Finally, legal counsel on both sides might find our forecasts useful as benchmarks in 
producing their own predictions of expected sentencing outcomes for particular cases when 
providing legal advice for their employers.
4 Forecasting Design Issues
The model estimates and the subsequent forecasts produced in this article are based on a 
reasonably comprehensive specification of the sentencing process. Considerable sentencing 
variation, however, remains unexplained by our analysis. There are a number of reasons for this
which could be addressed in a quest to provide more accurate statistical results than we have 
achieved, and are discussed in section 5 of Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013). Of 
particular relevance to the goal of accurate forecasting are the following.
· The courts’ inclusion and reporting of endpoint fines in cases involving financial 
limitations and their routine inclusion (along with starting points) in Returns on 
Prosecution. A major benefit should be the reduction in the number of seriously under-
predicted fines where, typically, serious financial limitations are paramount.
· A clear indication whether deterrence is included as a sentencing factor and if, so, a clear 
distinction between whether (or both) general deterrence or specific deterrence is 
relevant. Returns on Prosecution, for example, do not currently make such a distinction.  
Forecasting accuracy is unlikely to be aided if deterrence effects are not properly 
captured in the estimation process, and deterrence variables rarely have much explanatory 
power in our estimated model.
· Given that approximately four out of five levels of harm are recorded as ‘high’ in our 
database, a finer gradation of harm than the three broad bands of ‘fatal’, ‘high’ and ‘low-
medium’ harm is recommended. 
5 Concluding Remarks
Using a fairly comprehensive empirical model of sentencing factors, this article has used 
the most general specification of our model to forecast fines at the case level in periods prior to 
and following the introduction of the Hanham & Philp Guidelines in December 2008. We find 
that a considerable majority of the later period forecasted fines using earlier period estimated 
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coefficients from our most general model involve under-predictions, a result that is not apparent 
when later period coefficients are used for forecasting the same period’s fines. This reinforces 
our view that there is strong evidence in support of the continued use of HSE sentencing 
guidelines to induce District Court judges to change their sentencing behaviour, particularly 
where the guidelines (and subsequent appeal cases) provide a more structured approach.
 As with estimation issues, however, more accurate forecasts using our analysis will 
most likely call for some modifications to be made to the available data.  The latter would
require a slightly more systematic and transparent treatment of sentencing factors by the 
judiciary, along with a slightly more consistent and detailed reporting in Returns on 
Prosecutions. Access to a comprehensive electronic database of judicial decisions and sentencing 
notes would be preferable. Some residual variation in sentencing, however, will always occur.
To distinguish “warranted” from “unwarranted” variation, analysis of individual cases appears 
inevitable. In the present paper, we have illustrated some features of a number of cases that 
appear to us to be obvious outliers in terms of their estimated forecast errors. Where serious 
under-predictions of fines occur, some employers are Crown entities that cannot be fined while 
others receive favourable treatment due mainly to their charitable status. For the rest, there is 
usually an accepted inability to pay fines (and sometimes reparations as well) at an appropriate 
level, and in Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013) we have suggested some possible 
remedies in this context.
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